Not only do students acquire conceptual knowlcdgc. they also have to Icarn to USC that knowledge in tasks rclcvant to their future profession. In mcdicinc, they must learn to take a patient's history, do a physical examination, and order lilb lcsts in or&r to make a diagnosis. These responsibilities require a base of well-organiscd knowlcdgc, as well as cognitive, perceptual and psychomotor skills. Physicians must also bc able to decide on patient management and treatment, and they need the knowlcdgc and skills to communicate to the patient their assessment of the situation and the strategy to be taken. Justification and explanation. adapted to the level of comprehension of the patient, play an important role in patient compliance. Typically, the knowledge and skills needed for these tasks arc not learned through direct teaching, nor are they learned from books, but through demonstrations, practical training, and while the students are immersed in medical practice during their clerkships or internships (Patrick, 1992 During development of medical expertise, knowledge is accumulated and rcstructurcd.
In our theory, two ways of restructuring are discerned: knowledge encapsulation and illness script formation. In the next paragraphs, these processes will be described.
In the course of their medical training, especially in the first four years of the curriculum, students develop rich, elaborated causal networks explaining the causes and consequences of disease in terms of general underlying biological or pathophysiological processes integrating knowledge from several domains. The result of such network construction is that fourth-year students are able to set up lines of reasoning that can connect such diverse findings as "%-year old man". "pain deep in the abdomen and perineum", "the pain is worse while sitting straight than while lying down", "painful, frequent, difficult micturition" and "soft, enlarged prostrate". In the think-aloud protocol of a fourth-year student3 who reasoned about such a case, we find such concepts as .'Thcsc cxamplcs arc taken from two unpublished protocols of II fourth-year student and an cxpcricnced family physician who rcusoncd about a case of prostatitis in Q think-aloud cxpcrimcnr. (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992) . For instance, a physician who diagnosed the same case referred to an anatomical structure only once. when he said that he expected that the median lobe of the prostate would be enlarged (and not the right one as could be concluded from the case description). Instead, he used concepts such as urine retention.
Furthermore, he was very focused on the prostate as the source of the patient's problems and came to a conclusion in far less time than the student.
These differences between the protocols are a consequence of knowledge restructuring that has resulted from extensive and repeated application of knowledge, restructuring which has occurred particularly through exposure to patient problems.4 This restructuring which has taken place in the course of the development from novice to expert has led to abbreviations in the lines of reasoning set up in problem solving. In terms of the learning proccsscs dcscribcd cnrlicr in this article. knowlcdgc encapsulation is an advanced form of the restructuring phase in a cycle of conceptual learning.
By its use, dcclarativc knowlcdgc structures bccomc entrenched in dcclarativc concepts with a higher Icvcl of cfticicncy and practicality. Encapsulating concepts do not ncccssarily have to bc more abstract in the scnsc of being higher in a hierarchy, although this might be the cast. For instance. in our view, the concept "mammal" is not so much an encapsulation because it subsumes alI the animals which ;ITC members of that class, but rather because it cncapsulatcs the knowlcdgc that there arc animals that have a body tcmperaturc that is rclativcly indcpcndcnt of the environmental tcmperaturc, that have a (more or Icss) furry skin. that do not lay eggs hut have live-born babies that are nursed with milk producccl by i\ special gland in the mother. etc. In the same vein. "urine rctcntion"
is not an encapsulation bccausc it is hierarchically at ;I higher position than While solving a problem. a physician searches for an appropriate script and, when he or she has sclcctcd one (prostatitis in our example) or a few, he or she will tend to match its elcmcnts to the information provided by the patient. hcncc the focused protocol of the cxpcrt. In the course of this script-verification process, the script becomes instantiated.
The illness script that is best instantiated will be favourcd among the possible diagnoses. An example of such a case description can be found in Appendix 1.
Subjects were asked to produce a diagnosis and explain the pathophysiological process underlying the cast. Depending on the experimental condition, subjects were given the opportunity to read each GISC for 3 minutes (3'00"). I minute and 1.5 seconds (1'1.5").
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or 30 seconds (30"). Subjects were free to use as much time as they needed for the assignments. The order of case presentation was balanced. Diagnoses were scored on a scale ranging from 0 (incorrect diagnosis) to 6 (completely correct diagnosis) for each case. The pathophysiological explanations were schematised as semantic networks. The total number of concepts in these schematised explanations was counted. For each case, an ideal explanation was constructed (see Appendix 2). This explanation contained the minimal set of pathophysiologically and clinically relevant concepts necessary to explain the signs and symptoms in the case. The subjects' explanations were matched against the ideal explanations: the number of concepts in the explanation which were identical or equivalent to concepts in the ideal explanation was counted (termed "model concepts"), as was the number of explanation concepts that were at a more detailed level. These three measures, in isolation and in combination, reflect knowledge encapsulation. The number of concepts in the pathophysiological explanations will first increase and subsequently decrease. The number of model concepts will increase while the detailed concepts should decrease. A worked out example of this scoring procedure can be found in Appendices C-D. The data were analyzed with a 3-factor ANOVA with repeated mensurcmcnts over one factor (case). e.g., RIO sccond-ycitr students and only a few fourth-year students had recogniscd iIt Icast one important aspect of the diagnosis, but students in the present study could do that. This phenomenon could explain why students arc not so susceptible to time constraint manipulations as in the original experiment. but it does not clarify why experts also seem only slightly affected by differences in reading time.
Expcrimcnt 2
In the introduction of this paper it wils conjectured that illness scripts develop around conceptual clusters of knowledge about diseases (more or less cncapsulatcd depending on the lcvcl of learning) describing the fault at hand. and that illness script dcvelopmcnt is primarily affcctcd by practical cxpcricnces with patients in a diagnostic 
